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Symposium on Justin Remhof's Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material 
Objects (Routledge, 2018) 
Abstract 
Like Kant, the German Idealists, and many neo-Kantian philosophers before him, Nietzsche was 
persistently concerned with metaphysical questions about the nature of objects. His texts often 
address questions concerning the existence and non-existence of objects, the relation of objects 
to human minds, and how different views of objects impact commitments in many areas of 
philosophy―not just metaphysics, but also language, epistemology, science, logic and 
mathematics, and even ethics. In this book, Remhof presents a systematic and comprehensive 
analysis of Nietzsche’s material object metaphysics. He argues that Nietzsche embraces the 
controversial constructivist view that all concrete objects are socially constructed. Reading 
Nietzsche as a constructivist, Remhof contends, provides fresh insight into Nietzsche’s views on 
truth, science, naturalism, and nihilism. The book also investigates how Nietzsche’s view of 
objects compares with views offered by influential American pragmatists and explores the 
implications of Nietzsche’s constructivism for debates in contemporary material object 
metaphysics. Nietzsche’s Constructivism is a highly original and timely contribution to the 
steadily growing literature on Nietzsche’s thought. 
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Précis of Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects (Routledge, 2018) 
 
In this book I set out to provide a comprehensive account of Nietzsche’s material object 
metaphysics and argue that he is a constructivist. Constructivism is the neo-Kantian view that 
our representational practices bring all concrete objects into existence. This reading of Nietzsche 
is not brand-new in the literature. But it is certainly not mainstream. And constructivism is quite 
a contentious view of objects in its own right—the position strikes most readers as either flat-out 
false or too controversial for comfort. Perhaps this is why Nietzsche’s constructivism has never 
been systematically explained or defended. As I see things, however, once Nietzsche’s view is 
properly explicated his position is much stronger than it might initially seem to be, and I think 
reading Nietzsche as a constructivist can help illuminate many key areas of his philosophical 
program as a whole.  
The book starts by challenging alternative readings of Nietzsche’s view of objects. Some 
believe that he is a commonsense realist (Clark 1990; Leiter 1994, 2002). Others hold that he is 
an eliminativist (Nola 1999; Meyer 2011). Some argue that he reconceives objects as bundles of 
forces, or more simply, bundles of empirical properties. One version of this view, unificationism, 
holds that bundles are unified intrinsically (Hales and Welshon 1999; Doyle 2009). Another 
version holds that bundles are unified extrinsically, specifically though human representational 
practices. I defend this last reading.  
On my view, Nietzsche holds that objects are conceptually unified bundles of empirical 
properties. Planets, for instance, are bundles of properties the concept <planet> refers to, namely, 
objects that orbit the sun, remain round, and are gravitationally dominant. The world is filled 
with various clusters of properties, Nietzsche thinks, but no cluster is a formal unity—and thus a 
 3 
bona fide object—apart from our representational practices. This view of objects, I argue, best 
fits Nietzsche’s texts. From early to late, Nietzsche repeatedly claims that objects are 
ontologically dependent on human actions. Commonsense realism, eliminativism, and 
unificationism all deny such dependence. Hence none get Nietzsche right.    
 Constructivism does not imply that we can simply create objects at will, or that the 
existence of objects depends merely on subjective preferences, or that with respect to what 
objects exist anything goes. Nietzsche places significant constraints on construction, though no 
constraint uniquely determines what is or can be constructed. Most importantly, object 
construction depends on empirical properties that can be encountered in experience. Objects are 
bundles of properties that we have sensible access to. Other constraints on construction include 
the experience of resistance, the current body of accepted beliefs, the fact that construction is a 
social phenomenon, and epistemic values like consistency, utility, and scope. These constraints 
rein in subjectivism and facile forms of relativism. 
 The fact that Nietzsche’s constructivism is heavily constrained does not mean that the 
position comes without serious objections. Perhaps the most pressing objection is that 
constructivism, Nietzsche’s or otherwise, is bankrupt because it cannot account for unperceived 
objects, most notably objects in the past. It is obvious that dinosaurs roamed the earth prior to the 
existence of human representational practices, for instance, and so it appears false that our 
practices bring dinosaurs into existence.  
I suggest that Nietzsche can respond to this worry by drawing on Kant’s view that reality 
is that which we can in principle encounter in experience. To say that velociraptors existed, for 
example, is to say that we can track a causal chain from something we perceive in the present—
perhaps the perception of some recently uncovered fossils—back to when the application 
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conditions for the concept <velociraptor> are met. And, crucially, we play a constitutive role in 
determining these conditions, that is, which group of identifying properties <velociraptor> 
bundles. These properties include being a bipedal feathered carnivore in the Cretaceous period. 
The specific group of properties that constitute objects like velociraptors are brought together 
through our conceptual organization of the world, past or present. This allows Nietzsche to say 
that objects in the past are constructed. 
 Another objection concerns bootstrapping. Nietzsche holds that we bring objects into 
existence. One might argue, however, that we are also objects. It therefore seems that objects 
bring objects into existence, which appears absurd. I think Nietzsche’s response is to explain 
away the problem. For Nietzsche, we gain determinate conditions of identity as we attempt to 
understand who we are in experience, from evolved organisms, to moral persons, to mothers and 
fathers. If this is accurate, then there seems to be no problem in claiming that we construct 
objects and we are constructed in turn.  
 Understanding that Nietzsche is a constructivist enables us to gain a better understanding 
of other important aspects of his philosophical project. Consider his views of truth and science, 
for instance. It is more or less standard to believe that Nietzsche rejects the pragmatist view that 
truth consists in beliefs that work given our interests. I suggest that Nietzsche endorses what 
William James and F. C. S. Schiller call a “humanist” view of truth. On this view, truths 
concerning concrete objects are constructed because the objects of reference of our true and false 
propositions that populate the empirical world are constructed. Nietzsche embraces a pragmatist 
understanding of truth in the sense that propositions pertaining to the empirical world gain a 
truth-evaluable status only in relation to our interests.  
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 Nietzsche’s view of science is even more controversial. Commentators disagree over 
whether Nietzsche thinks science can represent the facts about the world. Some believe that 
Nietzsche takes science to be successful because it represents the mind-independent world. 
Others believe that he rejects the possibility of successful science altogether. I argue that 
Nietzsche’s praise of science rests on accepting constructivism. It is a short path from 
constructivism about objects to constructivism about facts. Nietzsche seems to think a fact is just 
an object instantiating a property, and if so, then determining which properties constitute objects 
implies determining the facts about the world. Science can then successfully represent the world, 
and success turns on facts being mind-dependent.  
 Why might Nietzsche be motivated to embrace such a controversial view of facts and 
objects? I think his motivation lies in overcoming what worries him most: the advent of nihilism. 
For Nietzsche nihilism is the position that life is meaningless because our highest values cannot 
be realized in this world. One such value is what Nietzsche calls the “true world,” that is, some 
world ontologically independent of the empirical world. From Plato and the Forms to 
Christianity and the Kingdom of Heaven, Nietzsche thinks humans have most often turned to the 
true world to find life meaningful. Even those who dedicate their lives to science and philosophy, 
Nietzsche argues, have been seduced into valuing the true world. Scientists and philosophers 
commonly believe that our best theories should be those that represent constitutively mind-
independent objects.  
Constructivism renders this goal unattainable. Coming to recognize the truth of 
constructivism therefore enables us to see that a longstanding goal of scientific and philosophical 
inquiry cannot be realized. Constructivism even rejuvenates our cognitive aims with new 
purpose, which helps us overcome nihilism concerning our theoretical projects. Constructivism 
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is not merely a metaphysical position, then, but a metaphysical position with vital ethical 
consequences—consequences that other readings of Nietzsche’s view of objects (common sense 
realism, eliminativism, and unificationism) are not in a position to enjoy. In fact, by denying the 
constitutive dependence between objects and human practices, the other readings are essentially 
nihilistic.  
The book’s penultimate chapter compares and contrasts Nietzsche’s constructivism with 
seemingly similar versions offered by those in the American pragmatist tradition, namely, 
William James, Nelson Goodman, and Richard Rorty. I argue that Nietzsche is closest to James 
and furthest from Rorty. The book finishes with an examination of how Nietzsche’s 
constructivism might resolve difficult problems in analytic material object metaphysics, 
specifically the argument from vagueness, arbitrariness arguments, debunking arguments, and 
arguments concerning indeterminate identity. Most metaphysicians today reject the 
commonsense idea that what objects exist are those we typically take to exist, such as dogs and 
cats, planets and moons, and the like. Instead they believe that there are either indefinitely many 
objects right before our eyes (permissivism) or no objects (eliminativism). Both of these options 
should strike us as extremely bizarre. I argue that Nietzsche’s constructivism provides a 
principled, unique way to push back. 
For example, consider how a constructivist might respond to a common argument from 
arbitrariness. Permissivists might claim that incars exist because islands exist. Incars are cars 
that only exist in garages. They go out of existence when leaving a garage, similar to the way in 
which we might say that islands go out of existence when completely submerged in water. This 
similarity leads permissivists to claim that there is no ontologically significant difference 
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between islands and incars. Consequently, it seems objectionably arbitrary to accept the 
existence of islands but not incars.  
The constructivist, however, can say that there is indeed an ontologically significant 
difference: we take there to be islands and no incars. This sounds simple, but the reasoning is 
neither obvious nor philosophically shallow. The constructivist argues that there are no unique 
bundles of properties in the world that require reference by way of extraordinary concepts like 
<incar>, whereas there are for <island>. The identity conditions of incars can be sufficiently 
picked out using familiar concepts like <car>, <garage>, and so on. This is just one way 
constructivism offers a principled way to take back a world that has slipped through the fingers 
of analytic metaphysicians.  
But—and I will finish with this—Nietzsche’s constructivism is flexible, and for the 
better. Nietzsche is certainly not trapped into defending common sense ontologies. 
Constructivism can adapt with the times. Nietzsche simply denies that any particular conceptual 
scheme has the ability to represent the way objects are tenselessly and timelessly. Our concepts, 
which fix the conditions of identity of objects, develop and change in relation to our needs, 
interests, and purposes. Given our perennial interest in understanding the existence and nature of 
objects that shape our perception of the world and of ourselves differently over time—from 
gendered bodies, to invasive species, to artificially intelligent entities—the ability to permit 
significant change, and sometimes even radical change, might be the most valuable quality of 
Nietzsche’s constructivism.  
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Remhof, Response to Adler 
I want to thank Professor Adler for his insightful comments. In what follows, I address 
three issues: the distinction between macroscopic and microscopic objects, how Nietzsche’s 
constructivist project responds to Kant, and the subject of construction. 
Adler first asks whether the distinction between macroscopic and microscopic objects is 
constructed, or if it reflects some mind-independent way the world is. My answer is the former. 
For Nietzsche, objects that exist fall under our kind terms, including the terms <macroscopic> 
and <microscopic>. Kind terms are devised in relation to our interests. Nietzsche, along with 
modern science, has an interest in differentiating macroscopic objects, like tables and trees, from 
microscopic objects, like forces. And this division is not arbitrary. For instance, different kinds 
of objects figure into different kinds of explanations, from ordinary to scientific, and such 
explanatory differences can be ontologically significant.  
Are microscopic objects constructed? Adler quotes my “intuitive motivation” for such a 
position here: 
if existence conditions depend on identity conditions, and identity conditions depend on 
descriptive representations, then the view that some objects are unconstructed seems to 
require there to be objects fully apart from the possibility of descriptive representation. 
Such objects can only be noumenal objects, or things in themselves, which Nietzsche 
discards. Hence, all objects, including both macroscopic and microscopic objects, are 
constructed.  
Adler asks why we need to think that unconstructed objects are fully apart from the possibility of 
representation. For instance, why not say that there is an aspect of the object that cannot be 
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described? In response, I think we have to say unconstructed objects are fully apart from the 
possibility of representation because if we can claim that it is not possible to represent some 
portion of an object, then we have to be able to represent, in some sense, that portion that we 
cannot access. This seems either impossible or incoherent. We would not be able to answer, for 
instance, what aspects of an object are in principle inaccessible. As a result, objects with portions 
that cannot in principle be constructed amount to unconstructed objects. On the other hand, 
objects with portions that, for whatever reason, are not actually constructed, but which are 
nonetheless in principle accessible, are constructed. For Nietzsche, there is reason to think this 
holds for all objects. 
Next, Adler holds that Nietzsche’s theoretical project fails to take Kant seriously. Kant is 
interested in providing transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience, a project 
Nietzsche rejects. As I see things, however, Nietzsche trades Kant’s project for naturalizing the 
conditions of experience. By doing so, he denies Kantian objectivity, which is grounded in non-
empirical concepts. Nietzsche makes remarks to the effect that Kant’s understanding of 
mathematical concepts, basic ontological concepts like substance and causation, and concepts 
underlying the natural sciences, lack the objectivity Kant claims. All such concepts are 
constructed to organize experience in accordance with the needs, interests, and values of 
creatures like us, which change and develop over time. Thus, I think Nietzsche sees through 
Kant’s failure to grasp the ontological significance of empirical concepts and the dynamic nature 
of those concepts. 
Adler suggests that empirical concepts very well account for the particular identity 
conditions of objects like suns, moons, and stars, but not identity conditions as such, which 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy appears to provide. Nietzsche’s response is to reject the 
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plausibility of accounting for identity conditions as such. Nietzsche often reiterates that there is 
no unitary experience for experiencers like us, or no single “subject” of experience, as Adler puts 
it. This suggests there are no grounds for the deriving constitutive elements of the possibility of 
experience in general. The untenability of this project undermines the search for concepts that 
account for the identity conditions of objecthood in general. Concepts like <substance> and 
<causality>, which Kant uses to define objecthood, can only provide particular kinds of 
conditions of identity, which reflect how and why they are developed and applied. 
I therefore think Nietzsche develops a substantive post-Kantian epistemology and 
metaphysics. Nietzsche’s epistemology turns on the ways in which situated knowers organize 
complex information in their environment in order to understand it. Knowledge is not the result 
of representing objects that reflect the basic conceptual structures our mode of cognition, but of 
creating and applying representations that structure incoming information for us to thrive, both 
theoretically and practically. Against Kant, Nietzsche offers new conditions of the possibility of 
what objects exist and how we can know them. 
I want to close by briefly commenting on the “we” of construction in the context of 
Adler’s reading that, on Nietzsche’s account, social construction always occurs within social 
relations of dominance and subordination. I think this is indeed Nietzsche’s view and that it 
certainly distinguishes Nietzsche from Kant and Hegel. But there is nothing substantively 
“social” in Kant’s constructivism, as I just suggested, and I do not think Hegel is a constructivist 
about material objects like Nietzsche.  
One might argue that, if anything, Nietzsche’s view is closer to Rorty’s. Rorty is a self-
proclaimed constructivist who seems to have a similar view of social relations. Importantly, 
though, unlike Rorty, Nietzsche holds that construction is answerable to non-linguistic reality. 
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Thus, conflicts concerning the existence or non-existence of certain objects between dominant 
and subordinate social groups need not turn merely on disputes concerning language, or simply 
what some group has the opportunity to say against another, with the hope that disputes will be 
resolved by commitment to satisfying shared purposes of the community. Such conflicts can be 
mediated by the world, in addition to other epistemic constraints. There will of course be 
interpretive disputes, especially when social groups are at cross-purposes, embrace different 
epistemic values, or rely on different conceptual frameworks. But at least there is reason to think 
that disputes can concern some common ground, and this can do some work toward ameliorating 
















Remhof, Response to Cabrera 
I think Professor Cabrera’s first reaction to Nietzsche’s constructivist view is exactly the 
reaction most others have: disbelief! After all, how could all objects be socially constructed? 
Cabrera’s thoughtful comments clearly target some of the difficult issues at the heart of this 
question. I will take these issues one at a time.  
Cabrera opens by remarking that the view seems less plausible if the relation between 
agents and objects is constitutive rather than causal. But I think there are good reasons to think 
otherwise. It seems clearly false that we causally construct stars, for instance, whereas it 
certainly seems plausible to think that stars gain determinate conditions of identity as the 
scientific community develops theories concerning what constitutes a star.  
Cabrera then suggests that for Nietzsche objects seem to be created in the same way that 
fictional characters are created. Cabrera seems to have in mind the artifactualist view that 
fictional objects, like Storm from the X-Men, are artifacts that come into being once they are 
conceived by their authors. The primary difference between this view and constructivism is this: 
fictional objects might exist merely due to our representational activities, whereas Nietzsche 
holds that our representational activities must refer to what which can be verified in sense 
experience. And Nietzsche offers numerous other constraints, including epistemic virtues, that 
wouldn’t sit well with artifactualists.  
Cabrera points out that some of the constraints on construction must come from the 
objects themselves. I imagine Cabrera has in mind that objects have intrinsic properties. But, as I 
argue in the book, Nietzsche rejects such properties. For Nietzsche there are no properties 
constitutively independent of other properties, including the property of standing in some 
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relation to human beings. Nietzsche’s ontology is wholly relational—all properties are 
ontologically interdependent.  
Now turn to unperceived objects. For Nietzsche and Kant, I say that “If there had been no 
people, there would still have been the things that would be constructed by humans were they to 
be around.” Cabrera asks how this is compatible with the constructivist claim that objects are 
constitutively dependent on us. After all, how can objects depend on us if they can exist when 
we’re not around? We might say that in worlds where there are no people, there are still some 
objects—namely, the things that humans would have constructed if they were around (so 
dinosaurs, stars, and so on). But notice that the objects that exist in these worlds are only possible 
objects. They do not in fact exist since in those worlds humans are not in fact around. Hence the 
actual existence of objects remains constitutively dependent on us.  
Thinkers naturally inimical to Kantian forms of idealism will find the idea that there are 
no objects in worlds without human beings counterintuitive. But Nietzsche does not have this 
intuition. Not all metaphysicians do either.1 Nietzsche would of course argue that intuitions are 
theoretically-loaded. For him—along with others, such as William James and Nelson 
Goodman—Kantian views concerning objects are much more intuitive. It is not wildly 
unreasonable to suppose that positing the existence of objects requires conceptually representing 
some kinds of objects or other, in which case there is no sense in positing the existence of objects 
fully outside the possibility of what can be conceptually represented. Take objects in the past, for 
example. Saying something existed prior to us does not imply than any particular kinds of objects 
or other existed. And this kind of general pointing is all that non-Kantian intuitions allow. For 
 
1 See, e.g., Kenneth Pearce, “Mereological Idealism” in Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce (eds), Idealism: 
New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
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Nietzsche objects before us certainly exist. They are constructed as we organize properties that 
we posit to have existed in the past given what we can encounter in the present.  
The final issue concerns vagueness. Although I use constructivism to challenge the view 
that there cannot be sharp cut-offs in a sorites series for composition, Cabrera has the intuition 
that there could be borderline cases of composition. Can Nietzsche help himself to this intuition? 
Perhaps he can. The view that there cannot be exact cut-offs is often justified by claiming that 
such cut-offs would be arbitrary. I argue, on Nietzsche’s behalf, that this arbitrariness turns on 
thinking that there are facts of the matter concerning composition independent of the minds 
thinking about composition. But facts concerning when a head and handle compose a hammer, 
for instance, might depend on what we use hammers for, namely, successful hammering. If so, 
then sharp cut-offs might not be arbitrary. They are meant to differentiate success or failure to 
perform some function. Importantly, we might be able to embrace cases of borderline 
composition if we run this kind of argument on each admissible application condition of the 
concept <hammer>. Each admissible condition of <hammer> would need to satisfy the function 
of being a hammer. We determine the acceptable range of fulfillment. Thus, we render the range 
of acceptable cases non-arbitrary for satisfying our purposes concerning hammers.  
This response fits well with Nietzsche’s view that truth is approximate. Nietzsche holds 
that representation necessarily approximates its target. And, importantly, the evaluation of an 
approximate representation depends in part on some set of concerns which help render the truth 
conditions of approximate representations determinate, including over a range or cases. Thus, 
Nietzsche can say that borderline cases of composition have a determinate truth-value. 
If what I have said is accurate, then we do not need to say that Nietzschean 
constructivism is incompatible with semantic vagueness. Thus, Cabrera need not be worried that 
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the Nietzschean constructivist must provide exact cut-offs for all cases of composition in order to 
hold off permissivism and eliminativism.  
In conclusion, I am happy to see that Cabrera sees why and how constructivism might be 
a contender in contemporary analytic material object metaphysics. I do think that we should take 
seriously any view that can provide principled responses to difficult, longstanding problems in 
metaphysics, however controversial they might seem at first glance. And maybe—just maybe—
the reaction of disbelief one often has when first confronting constructivism will have less effect 


















Remhof, Response to Doyle 
 I want to thank Professor Doyle for her detailed and penetrating commentary. In what 
follows, I focus on three issues: the nature of objects in Nietzsche’s writings, possible challenges 
from BGE 15 and GS 112, and constructivism’s role in overcoming nihilism. 
 First let me consider the nature of objects. Doyle first pushes back against my reading by 
remarking, “if our constructive practices are resisted by reality through us being affected by 
sensory information, as Remhof suggests […] then, it seems that objects are not constituted 
solely by human beings. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that reality and human social 
practices co-constitute objects.” This is actually an accurate depiction of constructivism—it is no 
challenge to my reading. Interestingly, the co-constitution relation Doyle tries to levy against 
constructivism actually appears to undermine her own reading that objects are intrinsically 
unified bundles of forces.  
The texts—and Doyle is perfectly okay with referencing the Nachlass—strongly suggest 
that Nietzsche thinks bundles of forces are constituted by their contextual relations with all other 
bundles. Nietzsche notes that a bundle of force’s "essence lies in [its] relation to all other 
[bundles]” (KSA 13:14[79]). Importantly, Nietzsche thinks human interpreters are themselves 
particularly complex bundles of forces which exist in constitutive relations to other bundles of 
forces, and bundles of forces become objects only in contexts where bundles are conceptually 
unified (see KSA 13:14[98] and KSA 12:2[77], for example, and note that bundles of forces 
ground empirical properties). Human interpreters determine that some bundles are genuine 
objects through conceptual unification. Objects are therefore not intrinsically unified. Objects are 
unified extrinsically through human practices. This result of co-constitution suggests that the 
intrinsic unification reading is mistaken.  
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 Are there structures in the world that exhibit some degree of internal unification which 
resist our constructive efforts? As I say in the book, this certainly seems to be the case. But 
Nietzsche denies that such structures are genuine objects. To be an object is to be a conceptually 
organized bundle of empirical properties. Thus, structures outside conceptual organization are 
not objects. Undifferentiated reality, for example, is not a proper candidate for objecthood. 
Moreover, we cannot say anything intelligible about structures fully independent of conceptual 
organization, since such talk inevitably organizes experience through our concepts. So, there are 
either no objects beyond what we can talk about, or we are not justified in making any claims at 
all about such objects. As far as I know, there are no passages in Nietzsche which claim that 
objects exist outside the possibility of human representation.2 This means that there are no 
objects prior to human representation, or objects that fully escape the possibility of being 
represented. And, in any case, Doyle does not point to any such passages, so constructivism 
seems to be the correct reading. 
 Now consider BGE 15’s attack on idealism, where Nietzsche argues that the external 
world cannot be the cause of our sense organs, since our sense organs are themselves part of the 
external world, and nothing can be the cause of itself. Doyle writes that this not only tells against 
constructivism, but that my preferred response shows that Nietzsche fails to distinguish Kant 
from the neo-Kantians. I do not think either holds. On my reading, we are in causal contact with 
non-linguistic reality through our sensory apparatus, and we organize such reality into objects 
constitutively, not causally, through conceptual organization. Constructivism does not hold that 
 
2 One might argue that HH I: 9 is the exception. Nietzsche writes “It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the 
absolute possibility of it is hardly to be disputed.” But I am not convinced. First, this has nothing to do with genuine 
objects—it concerns entire worlds. Second, Nietzsche goes on to say that belief in metaphysical worlds was derived 
from “the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge” and that “When one has disclosed these methods as the 
foundation of all extant religions and metaphysical systems, one has refuted them!” And third, a few passages later 
Nietzsche seems to endorse the constructivist view that human beings have “made appearance appear,” or that “the 
world “has acquired color” and “we have been the colorists” (HH I: 16).   
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we causally bring object into existence. We do not construct planets through causal means. 
Rather, we organize the properties that constitute planet-hood once we causally encounter 
empirical properties that might provide the best candidates for planet-hood. And this is a neo-
Kantian view, rather than a Kantian view, since such organization is constitutive, contingent, and 
wholly a posteriori. 
Nietzsche thinks human interpreters also determine the specific conditions of identity of 
causal relations. Causal relations are not simply “given,” that is, determinately structured apart 
from our efforts. We construct cause and effect by individuating events for various purposes. 
Looking at GS 112, Doyle suggests that Nietzsche denies the existence of discrete causes and 
effects. But this is incorrect: he says that an “intellect” beyond our own, which could see the 
fundamental connectedness of all events, can justifiably reject discrete causes and effects. The 
fact that we differentiate cause and effect does not imply that causation does not exist—
constructivism is not eliminativism. Of course, as Doyle suggests, one could deny that what we 
construct is empirically real. But to do so is either to say that causation does not exist simpliciter, 
or to claim that causation is merely in our head. I see no textual evidence for either reading in GS 
112. Nietzsche says that “It is enough to view science as an attempt to humanize things as 
faithfully as possible; we learn to describe ourselves more and more precisely as we describe 
things and their succession” (GS 112). Constructivism, which holds causal events exist are co-
constituted by human practices and the world encountered in experience, makes good sense of 
this interesting idea.  
 Finally, let me address the relation between constructivism, values, and nihilism. Doyle 
holds that the biggest challenge to my reading is that constructivism does not sit well with 
Nietzsche’s pluralism about value. She writes, “If the world in which our values are realizable is 
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one that is constructed—inter-subjectively—by us then the values that are realizable in it must be 
ones that the community endorses and that are generally applicable.” She then claims that such 
general applicability is dangerously close to a universalist account of value, which is inconsistent 
with Nietzsche’s value pluralism.  
The value at issue in my book concerns what our best theories should do. Should they 
attempt to describe a mind-independent or a mind-dependent world? The former cannot be 
realized, I claim, and the latter can. I see no problem in Nietzsche thinking that everyone should 
embrace this value—after all, the alternative is nihilism. But this does not undermine value 
pluralism. For instance, my reading only concerns epistemic values. I leave the status of all other 
values open. Communities committed to constructivism certainly need not agree on the status of 
any values concerning what norms are best for us, for instance. And within the theoretical 
context, commitments to epistemic values will inevitably involve compromises and weightings, 
such as the trade-off between accuracy and simplicity, which assumes pluralism, and different 
scientific communities might embrace different epistemic values. Nietzsche never defends any 
single privileged set of epistemic values, unless of course the value in question is required for 
overcoming nihilism. For these reasons, I do not believe that what Doyle thinks is the biggest 







Remhof, Response to Migotti 
First let me express my thanks to Professor Migotti for his provocative commentary. In 
what follows, I first address truth and then the argument from vagueness.  
This is not the place to get into Nietzsche’s views about the truth of God’s existence. For 
starters, Nietzsche never openly claims that God does not exist. He instead thinks the belief that 
God exists is unjustified because it arises by way of unreliable means (see, e.g., D 95; GM II 19-
23). But this is beside the point. The point is that my constructivist reading does not imply 
anything regarding the truth of God’s existence. My view that Nietzsche rejects absolute truths 
exclusively concerns empirical objects like planets, not entities like God. The content of the 
truth-conditions of propositions that concern the empirical world differ in kind from the content 
of propositions that concern entities like God. The former can be constructed from empirical 
properties, for instance, while the latter cannot. 
What about Nietzsche and James on truth? James believes that truths are useful, or that 
usefulness, within constraints, explains truth. Nietzsche believes both truth and falsify are useful. 
So how do these two agree? They both believe that propositions about the empirical world are 
not truth-evaluable without the existence of material objects that we construct. It is one thing for 
propositions to be true or false. It is another to be truth-evaluable. The latter is required for the 
former. Nietzsche and James agree that constructivism enables us to evaluate propositions about 
the world as true and false. They disagree on what explains the nature of truth as a first-order 
evaluation of the world.  
Now consider Migotti’s worry concerning my Nietzschean constructivist solution to the 
problem of vagueness. Migotti argues that the attempt to establish sharp cut-offs in a sorites 
series for composition merely ends up shifting the problem of vagueness to other places rather 
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than eliminating it altogether. For instance, hammering is not the only thing hammers are used 
for, and the number of things they are used for is arguably vague. In response, notice that 
composite objects like hammers, stools, and cottages seem to have proper functions, that is, their 
parts are arranged for the sake of performing a function. Hammering is the proper function of a 
hammer. What lies outside this proper function might be vague, then, but this kind of vagueness 
does not challenge my view. 
Migotti then suggests that exactly what is required for a putative hammer to succeed or 
fail at being a hammer could be vague. Here is my response. Something is a hammer just in case 
it fulfills the proper function of a hammer, and if something fulfills the function of being a 
hammer it is a successful hammer. Thus, there is no ontological distinction between a hammer 
and a successful hammer—no new hammer exists when a hammer performs its proper function. 
Of course, whether a hammer performs its proper function depends on the specific needs and 
interests of hammer-users, from those building to those doing demolition. A hammer might 
fulfill its proper function poorly, that is, it might succeed at hammering, but not well. In this 
case, we have a defective hammer. And the grounds for establishing the ontological conditions 
that distinguish a defective hammer from a non-hammer are determined by the needs and 
interests of hammer-users. Vagueness exists only insofar as such needs and interests remain 
indeterminate, and I see no good reason to think that such indeterminacy cannot be overcome in 
specific contexts of use.  
Migotti’s non-constructivist solution to the problem of vagueness turns on rejecting the 
view that there can be no borderline cases of composition. For Migotti there can be borderline 
cases because we can quantify over intervals of time. One payoff he points out is that if we 
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accept borderline cases of vagueness then it seems that there is no need to find exact cut-offs. Let 
me present a challenge to this idea and then raise some questions.  
Take the sorites series of affixing a head onto a handle to compose a hammer. At the 
beginning, nothing composes a hammer. At the end, something does. And, Migotti holds, when 
composition occurs it does so over some interval of time in which there is no determinate answer 
to the question of how many objects exist. Yet, it seems that on every possible interval in the 
series there is a specific point at which some boundary condition of the interval, but not its 
immediate successor, marks the proper interval for a borderline case of composition. If so, then 
there will always be some sharp cut-off between composition proper and indeterminate 
composition. Perhaps Migotti cannot avoid sharp transitions.  
I also what to know what exactly quantification over an interval looks like. Migotti 
explains that within intervals of composition it is immaterial to ask how many objects there are 
because traditional logical quantification is not up to the task. Specifically, he suggests that some 
quantifier in some relevant numerical sentence, such as ‘There exist exactly two objects’, is 
indeterminate. But what does this mean? Efforts to answer this question in the literature have 
faced many problems. Migotti seems to want to say that during intervals the head and handle 
might not be everything there is—that perhaps there is something else. Can this be formalized? If 
so, how? And if not, how do we make sense of the view? 
In my response to Cabrera, I suggest how the Nietzschean constructivist might be able to 
embrace borderline cases of composition. Now consider one more way, which turns on 
Nietzsche’s views of logic and mathematics. Nietzsche might argue that the mere logical syntax 
of formal logical sentences has nothing to say about which objects actually exist. For Nietzsche, 
such sentences cannot be used to justify existence claims about objects like hammers, since 
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justification concerning which objects exist requires reference to conditions of identity set by 
conceptualization. Variables must be linked to domains of objects, which of course we construct. 
On these grounds, the warrant for saying there cannot be borderline cases of composition might 





















Remhof, Response to Pedersen 
Professor Pedersen was the main force behind putting together this symposium, and my 
deepest appreciation goes to him for all his hard work. In what follows, I attempt to address the 
main issues he raises.  
Let me first address conceptualizability. Pedersen is right to point out that, as I see things, 
Nietzsche does not believe that the existence of objects depends on any actual, or currently 
existing, conceptual organization of properties. Objecthood depends on the possibility of being 
conceptualized. This enables Nietzsche to avoid obvious problems concerning objects that might 
exist but which are not conceptualized.  
Importantly, conceptualization is a social phenomenon for Nietzsche. The unit of 
construction is a community of shared language users. But which language constructs objects, 
and how might Nietzsche account for language expansion? For Nietzsche, there is no single 
shared language, but rather, as I explain in my replies to Sinhababu and Adler, only languages 
manifest by dominant and subordinate social groups, with dominant groups having greater power 
to shape the world. Language expansion can be cumulative for Nietzsche in the sense that the 
bounds of conceptualizability are determined by L* now and whatever is conceptualizable when 
new items are added to L*, such that the bounds of conceptualizability change each time L* is 
expanded. Nietzsche thinks that certain methodological approaches to expanding languages are 
better than others. In particular, languages answerable to naturalist approaches to philosophy 
should dominate over non-naturalist conceptions of philosophy, in part because the objects that 
naturalists countenance better satisfy the constraints on what constitutes objects. Language 
expansion should be tied to such better methods. 
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Pedersen next asks about the nature of the range of cognitive capacities relevant to social 
constructivism. I think Nietzsche believes that we should we take the relevant cognitive 
capacities to reflect what can possibly be conceptualized by the cognitive capacities of some 
actual group of subjects. It is tempting to idealize by making the relevant cognitive capacities an 
arbitrary, finite extension of the current capacities of some designated group of subjects, thereby 
closely linking the modal commitment concerning the existence of objects to the modal 
commitment of the subjects representing objects. But Nietzsche shows no sign of locating the 
existence of objects in possible cognitive capacities.  
This is not to say that he thinks speculation concerning such capacities is not important. 
For instance, he claims that “higher culture must give to man a double-brain, as it were two 
brain-ventricles, one for the perceptions of science, the other for those of non-science” such as 
“illusions” and “passions”—in short art (HH I: 251). And he welcomes a future in which 
“artistic energies and the practical wisdom of life join scientific thought so that a higher organic 
system will develop” (GS 113). These “higher” systems embody cognitive capacities that can 
better understand the world, since, after all, objects in the world are the product of artistically-
oriented scientific organizations of experience. 
Turn next to Pedersen’s distinction between (Dep) and (Con). On my view, it is not the 
case that the former presents a necessary condition for the existence of material objects and the 
latter a sufficient condition. Instead, (Dep) specifies (Con). In the book, I write, “to say objects 
are socially constructed is to say that the existence conditions are essentially, by which I mean 
constitutively, dependent on the intentional activities of human agents” (19). Pedersen suggests 
that this is problematic because it does not seem that mere conceptualizability, that is, some mere 
intentional representational practice, can suffice for creating objects. And I certainly agree. 
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Concepts must unify empirical properties for objects to exist. Moreover, I do not think we should 
construe (Dep) in terms of conceptualizability and (Con) in terms of being conceptualized, such 
that conceptualizability sets the boundaries of the world while conceptualization makes objects 
within that world. For Nietzsche, and for Kant before him, conceptualizability determines 
existence—if something can be conceptualized in the advance of possible experience, it exists. 
That is the boundary of the world of material objects.  
Let me close by briefly addressing Pedersen’s paradox of conceptualizability. It should 
be clear that Nietzsche never addresses this paradox, so what follows can only be conjecture. 
One promising way of responding to the paradox is to accept a paraconsistent logic. Nietzsche 
might be amenable to this approach. In a paraconsistent logic some contradictions are permitted 
on the grounds that the inference from a contradiction to any arbitrary conclusion is not valid. 
The consequence of a contradiction need not ‘explode’ a view by rendering it trivial. 
Paraconsistency is then a property of the consequences of a contradiction.  
Nietzsche has nothing to say about this property, but embracing contradictions does 
provide one good reason for embracing paraconsistency. Nietzsche exclaims that the “principle 
of non-contradiction” is “not a criterion of truth, but rather an imperative about what shall count 
as true” (KSA 12:9[97]). We are not required to think the principle of non-contradiction as true a 
priori. The principle is regulative. Indeed, Nietzsche thinks logic in general is regulative: “Logic 
is the attempt to understand the real world according to a scheme of being that we have posited, 
or, more correctly, the attempt to make it formulatable, calculable for us” (KSA 12:9[97]). No 
logic is true a priori. Logics are adopted in relation to their ability to help us navigate the world. 
Sometimes that might involve corralling contradictions or the consequences of contradictions—
for instance, when we face theories which are inconsistent but non-trivial (see, e.g., BGE 22). So, 
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one way in which Nietzsche has a shot at responding to the paradox is to claim that the correct 
logic of conceptualizability is paraconsistent. But of course much more work needs to be done to 





















Remhof, Response to Sinhababu 
I first want to thank Professor Sinhababu for his illuminating commentary, and begin by 
saying that I like how he links constructivism about value to constructivism about objects. I am 
perfectly happy accepting that value exists because our passions constitute the objects of passion 
as valuable, and that material objects exist because our conceptual practices constitute the 
identity conditions of objects. This unifies some of Nietzsche’s important metaphysical 
commitments. 
Sinhababu first asks about the status of the psychological states that construct objects. I 
think it is safe to assume that Nietzsche thinks psychological states are concepts, insofar as we 
hold that psychological states are mental representational states with sematic properties, such as 
content, reference, truth-conditions, etc. Traditionally, mental representations can be understood 
in two ways: some are composed of concepts and have no phenomenal features, and others have 
phenomenal features but no conceptual content. For Nietzsche, mental representations are always 
composed of concepts, since consciousness consists in conceptual representation. And I argue in 
the book that Nietzsche embraces the conceptualist view that at least some phenomenal features, 
like sensations, actually have conceptually structured content. Thus, Nietzsche endorses an 
alternative way of understanding mental representation, a way which exemplifies the view that 
both our sensory and cognitive states contribute to conceptually structuring incoming 
information. Concepts then organize experience in two ways. On the one hand, conceptually 
structured sensory information contributes to organizing phenomenal experience, and on the 
other hand, determining the application conditions of our concepts fixes the conditions of 
identity for whatever meets them by unifying empirical properties into certain kinds of material 
objects. 
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How does Nietzsche understand concepts? I agree with Sinhababu that Nietzsche is 
sympathetic to the classical theory of concepts rather than the prototype theory. According to the 
classical theory, a concept C is composed of simpler concepts that express the correct application 
conditions of C. On this theory of concepts, then, reference is a matter of whether the 
constituents that express conditions for falling under the concept are satisfied. For Nietzsche, 
successful reference turns on sensory experience. Nietzsche holds that we become acquainted 
with “reality” by virtue of “the feeling [or sensation, Gefühl] [. . .] of resistance” (KSA 
12:9[91]). Through sensation, we experience resistance, which presents empirical properties that 
we organize into objects through conceptual unification. Ignoring sensory information when 
determining the application conditions of concepts, on Nietzsche’s version of the classical theory 
of concepts, leads to failure of reference.  
Sinhababu then looks at the constructivist’s understanding of the correspondence relation 
of concepts to objects. He asks whether one material object type corresponds to one simple 
concept, or if the logical operations we can perform upon concepts lead to material object types 
of their own. What turns on this distinction? If the latter is true, then we have a much better 
chance at linking constructivism with the universalist version of permissivism, which holds that 
any concrete objects conjoin to compose a further object. 
Nietzsche links one material object type to one simple concept. However, there is an 
important caveat. For Nietzsche, logical operations can function to organize the world in 
experience, and experience can also constrain which logical operations we accept. And, for this 
reason, constructivism can, in principle, support permissivism, or even eliminativism. Other than 
noumenal objects—objects inaccessible to us, like Kantian things in themselves—there are no 
types of objects that cannot, in principle, be constructed, assuming we satisfy the constraints on 
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construction that Nietzsche puts in place. For Nietzsche the concepts we devise and apply might 
make it the case that there are many more objects than we typically take to exist, as permissivism 
holds. Accepting this view might depend on how we interpret the nature, meaning, and 
application of logical operations, or how we take experience to constrain various logical 
operations. On Nietzsche’s account, no concept with intelligible content is immune to revision—
all constituents of such concepts can change.  
That being said, I suggest in the book that moving away from our commonsense ontology 
of objects to permissivism or eliminativism is not likely. Many of the concepts that form what 
William James calls “the stage of common sense” have been around since time immemorial 
because they remain expedient in the way of helping us navigate experience. It does not look like 
Nietzsche thinks we should revise our material object ontology in accordance with permissivism 
or eliminativism because it is not clear that whatever success extraordinary concepts might have 
in helping us navigate the world can eclipse the success we currently have using commonsense 
concepts. 
The final issue Sinhababu raises concerns whose concepts generate objects. Nietzsche, I 
think, provides a few clues regarding whose concepts generate objects. They are typically groups 
of people in positions of dominance (see GM I: 2). But such relations, such as the relation 
between a Kuhnian researcher to an exemplar of a paradigm, need not be pernicious. As I see 
things, Nietzsche thinks object ontologies become pernicious when subsumed by interpretive 
systems that are intrinsically problematic, like the ascetic ideal, which leads people to divorce the 
application conditions of concepts from the sensory world. 
Finally, for whom do particular sets of objects exist? Sinhababu has the concept of an 
electron, but Glaucon does not. So, do electrons exist for Sinhababu, but not Glaucon? I think we 
 32 
should say ‘no’. Electrons exist, though Glaucon did not realize it, because the scientific 
community has shown that <electron> does useful explanatory work in fixing the conditions of 
identity of elementary reality. For Nietzsche, many of the ways of organizing the world 
embraced by our ancestors fail to satisfy the constraints on object construction—constraints that 
emerge as our understanding of how we are affected in experience grows and develops. As our 
wealth of understanding deepens, we reinterpret the past to have contained, or not to have 
contained, certain kinds of objects—knowing we could be mistaken, of course, and going 
forward with that humility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
